Desktop destroyer 3 download windows#
In this paper, we propose a taxonomy of the Windows ASEPs, considering the features that are used or abused by malware to achieve persistence. The persistence is achieved using Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs), the subset of OS and application extensibility points that allow a program to auto-start without any explicit user invocation. Many security incidents are caused by malware that targets and persists as long as possible in a Windows system within an organization. The latter case, known as memory forensics, consists in dumping the memory to a file and analyzing it with the appropriate tools. It can also notify future security policies and mitigation strategy formulation.Ĭomputer forensics is performed during a security incident response process on disk devices or on the memory of the compromised system. In addition, the taxonomy can allow national security and intelligence agencies and businesses to share their analysis of ongoing, sensitive APT campaigns without the need to disclose detailed information about the campaigns. Such taxonomy can facilitate incident response and cyber threat hunting by aiding in understanding of the potential attacks to organizations as well as which attacks may surface. We then comprehensively analyze more than 40 APT campaigns disclosed before 2018 to build our taxonomy. Therefore, in this paper, we leverage the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) model to "decompose" any complex attack and identify the relevant characteristics of such attacks. Note, however, that existing information about APT attack campaigns is fragmented across practitioner, government (including intelligence/classified), and academic publications, and existing taxonomies generally have a narrow scope (e.g., to a limited number of APT campaigns). Specifically, we posit the importance of taxonomies in categorizing cyber-attacks. Thus, having up-to-date and detailed information of APT's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) facilitates the design of effective defense strategies as the focus of this paper.
For example, such threat actors often utilize a broad range of attack vectors, cyber and/or physical, and constantly evolve their attack tactics. APT and nation-state/sponsored actors tend to be more sophisticated, having access to significantly more resources and time to facilitate their attacks, which in most cases are not financially driven (unlike typical cyber-criminals). The need for cyber resilience is increasingly important in our technology-dependent society where computing devices and data have been, and will continue to be, the target of cyber-attackers, particularly advanced persistent threat (APT) and nation-state/sponsored actors.
0 kommentar(er)
